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Abs tr ac t
T h is p ap er prop oses a red uced form a p pro ac ht o e m p iri call y id en tify the pres-
enc e o f mono p oly p o w er i n oli go p oli es c hara cteri zed b yv ert i cal p r o d uct d i￿eren tia-
tion. In a fairl y g en era l mo del I deri v et he r e duce d fo rm pric in g equ a ti o n u nder the
h yp othesi s that ￿ r ms coll ud e b y maximi zi ng thei r j oi n t pro￿t. A cen tra l compar a-
tiv e st atic s resul t stat e s that a p r o d uct’ s pri ce dep ends only on its o wn quali t y and
not on the quali t yo f i t s comp eti t ors. I p r op o se si mple tests i mpl ied b y thi s resul t,
requi ring d a ta onl y o n the pri ces and t he p h ysi cal c har acteri st i cs of the pro d ucts.
The tests are appl ie d to t h e mar k et for spreadshee t si n t he US (198 6-199 1) and
to t h e mar k et for ‘engin e v a ri an t s’ i n the 1 990 F renc hc a r mark et . The emp iri cal
resul t sa re prom i si ng, but al so in dic a te t h e ne ed for further gen era l i zat i ons of the
mo del .
￿
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1 In tro duc ti on
During the pas t t w o decades th e re ha s b e en a renew e di n tere s t in em pi ric al ly i de n ti fying
the pre se nce of m ark et p o w er i ns e le cted i ndu stri es. Muc h o f the li terature has fo cused on
esti m ating s tr uc tura l form m o dels, cl os e ly f ol lo wing the re cen t dev elopm e n ts in oli go pol y
theory .
1
A structural fo rm m o del of an oli go pol yt ypic al ly consists of a de m a nd equation
a n da‘ s upply ’ equation, as determ ined b y the s p ec i￿c equi li brium a ssum pti o ns. Esti-
m ating structura l pa ram e ters is us uall y regard e da sv e ry ap p eali ng b ecause it all o w s for
ac l ear e con om i ci n te rpretation of the em piric al r e su l ts, and for p oli cy a nalysi s thro ugh
m o del sim ulations.
Th e re a re ,h o w ev er, a l s o disa dv an tag e s with the structural fo rm appro ac h. Most
im p ortan tly ,i tr e quire s sp eci ￿c assum ptions ab out the fun c tiona l f or m s. A h yp othesis
test for the prese nc eo fm ark e tp o w er is then alw ay s co ndi tiona l o n a ‘c o rre ct’ s p ec i￿cation
of th e functiona l fo rm s of dem and a nd supp l y .F urtherm ore, the structura l fo rm a pproa c h
req uires data on al l endog e n ous v ar i ab l es in t he m od e l, w hi c hi s no t alw ay s p oss i ble.
Fi na l ly , the ec o nom et ric pro ce du r es to e st i m ate ev en si m ple structural fo rm m o del s are
freq uen tl yc om puta ti o nall y burde n som e. A usef ul c om plem en tary a pproa c hi s there fore
often the re duced fo r m a pproa c h. This a pproa c hw r i tes th e e ndo genous v ar i ab l es s uc h
as pric es, qua n titi es or rev en ues a s a functi o n of the e xo genous v ariable ss o l el y , a nd then
esti m ates thi sr e lations hi p.
In this pap e r I p r opo se a r e du c ed form appro ac ht oi d e n tify the presenc eo f m on o pol y
po w er in oli g op oli es c h aracteri ze db yv e rtical pro du c t di￿eren t iation, i. e. di￿ere n tiation
in qua l it y . In a fairl y general m o del of on e -d i m e ns i o nal v erti cal pro du c t di￿ere n tiation
I deriv et h e reduce d form pri cing eq ua ti o ns under t he h yp othesis that ￿rm s col lude b y
m axi m iz ing thei r join t pro ￿t. A ce n tral c om pa rativ e s tatic s result s tates t h at a pro duc t’s
pric ed ep ends o nl yo ni ts o wn quali t y and no t on the qualit y of its com p eti to rs. I n the
abs e ns e of coll us i on thi sc om p arativ e sta ti cs result i s not lik el y to hold. I prop os e s i m pl e
ec o nom etr ic tests i m pli ed b y the com parativ e static s result. The tests re quire only da ta
on the price s and ph ysi ca l c hara c teristi cs of the pro duc ts . These a r ee xactly the sa m e
data as in the traditi o nal \h e do ni c" studie s.
Ih a v e appli ed the tests to t w o di￿eren ti ndus tri es: the m ark e t fo r spreads he ets in
1
Tw o fam ous con tributio ns are P o r ter (19 84) and B res na han ( 1 987). G e roski ( 1 988) and Br esn a han
(198 9) pro vide a s urv ey of t he l ite rature.2
the US (1 98 6-1 991 ) a nd the m ark et for "engine v arian ts" in the 199 0 F renc h car m ar k et.
The e m piri cal re su l ts a r e enc o urag i ng , a nd c o nsiste n t with s e v e ra l st yl ize d facts on b oth
industrie s. This i nd i cates the usefulne s s of the tests a s a ￿rs t appro ac hi n detec ting the
presenc e o f coll usion when there i sv erti cal pro duct di￿eren tiation. N ev erthel ess, the
result s call fo r so m e desirable furthe r gene ra l izati o ns o f the m o del.
Bre s naha n (19 87 ) has used a structural m o del of v e rtic al p r odu c td i ￿e ren ti at i on to
test f o r the presenc e of coll usion in the US car m ark e t during the m id-￿fti es. Hi sm o del
is a spe ci al c a se of the m o del presen ted in this pap e r, i tr e quire sm ore da t a , and it is
com putationa l ly dem anding, as discuss e di nB erry (1 99 4). I tw ou l db e i n teresti ng t o
i n v e sti ga te w he th e r the sim ple te sts de v e lop ed i n the presen tp a p e rw ould y iel d sim i lar
concl us i o ns a s tho se obta i ned b y Bre sn ahan (19 87).
M o s to fo u rc urren t kno wl edg e o n m ark et p o w er is ba sed on the em pi ric a l results from
structural fo rmm o del s. I n te rest i n the testable im pli cations o f reduc ed form m o dels h as
b een rel at i v e ly scarce. The m ost nota bl e con tri b uti o n is b yP anzar a nd Ro sse (19 87 ).
In a m o del with m ono p oly p ow er they disco v er a testable predi cti on abou t t h e e￿ect of
factor pric es{o rm o re generall y all e xo genous v ariables in￿uenci ng cos t bu t no t dem and
{ o n rev en ues.
2
They e m pha si ze the generali t y o f their result and the a ppl icabil it y
ev en when d ata on price s and q ua n ti tie s are no t separa te ly a v ail ab l e. In princi ple,
thei r te s t i sa p p l ic ab l et o a l l industrie s , incl ud i ng industrie sc ha racte riz ed b y p ro duct
di￿ere n tiation. In practi ce, ho w ev er, i nd ustri es w i th p ro duct di￿eren tiation d o often
notm ee t the data re quire m en ts to i m ple m en t the te st . I ns u c h industrie s there m a y
only b e da t aa v ail ab l eo np r i ces rather tha n on rev en ues. More im p orta n tly , there m a y
b e nod a t ao nt h e exogenou s v ariable st h a ta ￿ e ct cost an d n ot dem a nd, suc h a s factor
pric es. Ev e ni fs u c hd a t aw ou l de xist, there m a yb el ittle v ar i ab i li t yo ft h e se da ta
acros s pro ducts. In industrie s with pro duct di ￿ ere n ti at i o n the a v ai lable data on the
\exog e no us" v ari ab l es a re u suall y the pro ducts’ ph ysic al c hara c teri st i cs. Th e se ph ysic al
c ha racte ristic si n￿uence b oth m arg i na l cost a nd dem a nd, so tha t P an z a r and Ros se’ s test
canno t b e a ppl ied.
3
C onsequen tly , in industrie s with pro duct di ￿ ere n ti at i o n the tests
2
They s ho w that the su m of the e ￿ec t of the f ac tor price e l asticities o na m onop oli st ’ s red uced fo rm
re v en ue e qua ti on i s alw a ys nonp os i tiv e. Thi sp r o p ert ym a y not hol d in the abse nse o fm onop ol yp o w er .
3
More pre cise l y , one m a yv iew th e pro duc ts’ ph y si ca l c harac teristics as pre dete rm ine d, r a th er than
as exogenous v ari ables . They capture the e ￿ec ts of s o m e unde rly ing ‘ tr uely e xo ge no us ’ v ari ables e i the r
in￿uenc i ng cost ( suc h as factor price s) or de m and.3
dev el o p ed in this pa p er, or s om ev ari an ts there of , m a yb ep r e ferable.
Afte r pre se n ting th e m o del i n sec tion 2, secti o ns 3 an d 4 deri v et h er e duced fo r m
pric ing equation a nd the ce n tral com para ti v e s tati cs result. Sec tion 5 prop oses the
em piri ca l tests, wh i c h are app l ie di ns e ction 6 . Sec tion 7 pro vide s sug gested ex tensions .
2 The m od el
Co nsi de r the follo wi ng m o del of v erti cal pro duct di ￿e ren ti at i on , as in t ro duced b y Mus sa
and Rosen (19 78 ).
4
T he re a re N c o nsum e rs , all endo w ed with inc om e y , and n + 1 go od s,
i =0 ￿￿￿ n , where g o o d 0 is a n outs i d e g ood . A g ood i has a qualit y v
i
and i s sold a t a
pric e p
i
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. T h econd i tional i nd i rec t util it y of a cons um er of
t y pe ￿ buying pro duct i is g i v en b y
u
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, i =1 ￿￿￿n
w here ￿ 2 [￿ ;
￿
￿ ]i s a ta ste para m eter repre se n ti n g cons um er ￿ ’s m arg i na l w i ll ingness to
pa y fo r quali t y , with 0 ￿ ￿ <
￿
￿ . The cum ulativ ed i stribution of the taste pa ram et er
￿ i n the p o pul at i o n o f co nsum e rs is denoted b y F (x)=P ( ￿ ￿x ), wi th corresp onding



































￿ .B el o wi tw i l lb ec he c k ed whethe r this i s indee d the c a se. Mark e t dem and
for eac h g ood i , i =2 ￿￿ ￿ n ,i s then p ositi v e a nd giv en b yt h em ass of consum ers with a
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￿, so that F (￿
n+1
) = 1 . Mark e td e m and for
go o d 1 dep ends on whether o r no t al lc o nsum ers a re serv ed. If ￿ <￿
1
, not all cons um ers
4
Muss a and Rose n l o o ka tac o n tin u um of pro duc ts. The y m ak e us e of qui t e di￿er en tt e c hniques , i na
m ec hanism des i gn fram ew ork. Ne v e rthe l e ss, som e of the re sults he re s ho ws o m ei n te res ti ng sim i la ri ties ,
as the in ter es ted re ader m a yv er i fy .4
are s e rv e d; som e of the con sum e rs w an t to buy the outside go o d 0 . Otherwi se ,n o n eo f
t h e c o n sum ers on the i n te rv al [ ￿;
￿
￿] w a n t s to buy the outside go o d. A s sum ef o r sim plic it y
that ￿ <￿
1
, i.e .n o t a l l cons um ers are serv ed. T he alte rna ti v ec a se is the s trai gh tf or w ard
ana l o gue. Dem and for g o o d 1 then is:
q
1
=( F ( ￿
2
) ￿ F ( ￿
1
))N: (2)





), whic h i s indep enden t of output but i ncreasing and con v ex in quali t y . Pric es
are dete rm ine d a s foll o w s. The pric e of the outside go o d , p
0
,i s exogeno usl yg i v en, sa y
on a p erfec tly c om pe titi v el o w qua l it ym ark et. T he p ri ce s o f g ood s i , i =1 ￿￿￿n , are












Al tho ugh ￿rm s m a y in princi ple also c hoos e t h e q u al iti es of their pro ducts, I co nsi der
these c hoice s as exog e no us, or p r edeterm ined, at the pri cing sta ge. T he jus ti ￿cation is
that ￿rm s can a djust price s faster tha n quali tie s.
3 R e d u c ed form p ricing equations
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+1 ￿F ( ￿
n
)=0 :
Th e system of n ￿rst-o rde r conditi on s c an be so l v ed to o btain n reduced fo rm pri cing
eq u ati on s . Th e s ol ution m e tho d foll o ws t w o steps. Fir st a so l ut i on for the indi￿ere n t
consum ers ￿
i
is deri v e d. Th i ss o l ution is the nu s e d to deriv e the reduce d form pri cing
eq u ati on s ( as w el l a s the reduce d form dem an d e q u ati o ns).5


























. Rep ea t ing this sub sti tution g i v e s the foll o wi ng r ecursiv e syste m










































Assum e the functi on g ( x )i sm o notonicall y incre as i ng . Th i s as sum pti o n is sa ti s￿ e d for
m an y distributi on f un c tions , incl uding the uni fo rm , the P areto, the exp o ne n tial, the
norm al and the l o gisti c. This then y iel ds the foll o wi ng soluti o n for the ta ste pa ram et er
of the i ndi￿eren tc o nsum e rs ￿
i


















(y ) is the in v erse functi on o f g ( x ). The so l ution for ￿
1
is sim i larly de term i ned
















Th e reduc ed form dem and eq ua ti on s a r e no w eas i ly deri v ed b y s ubstituti ng the solu-
tions fo r ￿
i
in (2). The deri v at i o n of the reduc ed fo rm pric ing e quation require sa l ittl e

















as i m pli ed b y( 1 ) . Substituting the s oluti on s f or ￿
i
yi el d s the reduce d form coll us i v e


















































￿ , and whethe r ￿ ￿ ￿
1
,a s w as
as sum e d. F rom the s oluti o n for ￿
i
a nd the fa c t that g
￿1
(x)i sm ono tonic al ly inc reas i ng ,6

























) is inc reas i ng and
con v ex i nq ua l it y v
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F i n a l l y ,i t can b e v eri ￿ed tha t ￿ < ￿
1
, i. e. nota l l consum ers are s e rv e d in equi li br ium ,i f









4 C om parativ es ta tic s
The tests for the presenc eo f m on op o l yp o w er are ba se d on the c om p arativ e statics of
the reduc ed fo rm prici ng e qua ti o ns (4) in cos t and qua l it y . The com parativ e sta ti cs
under m on op o l yp o w er are lik el yt o b ed i st i nct fro m the com para t iv e static s under m ore
com p eti tiv e regim es. More sp e ci￿c al ly , fo r the v erti cal di￿eren tiation m od e l I sho w that
this is true for sev eral fre quen tl y used d i stribution functions of the tas te param ete r ￿ .
Using the reduce d form pric ing equation (4) the follo wi ng com para ti v e s tati cs c an be




























































































=0 , k = i +1 ￿￿ ￿ n























), i; k =1 ￿￿ ￿n
Th e c om pa rativ e sta ti cs yie ld a stro ng pre dicti o n a n daw e a k pre di cti on . Th e se
predi ctions c an be u se d to test fo r the presenc eo fm onop oly p o w er.
Strong pre dicti on of m onop ol yp o w e r: The price of pro duct i, p
i
,d o e s no t dep end





W eak pre dicti on of m onop oly p o w e r: If g
0 0
(x) = 0, then the pric e of pro duc t i, p
i
,





The strong predic tion of m o nop oly p ow er fol lo ws stra i gh tfo rw a rd fro m the com pa r a-



























(x ) = 0. N ot i ce tha t the w e a k predi ction
app l ie s to sev eral freq uen tl yu s e d distributi o ns, incl ud i ng the u ni fo r m ,t h e P areto and
the e xp o nen tial. Thi si si l lustrated b y the f ol lo wing m ore gene ra l distri bu ti on function
of the taste pa ram e ter ￿ , F
￿
(x), wh i c h nests the a b o v e thre es p e c ial cases:
F
￿









with ￿ 2 [ ￿ ; ￿ + (
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ )= ￿]i f ￿> 0 , and ￿ 2 [￿ ; 1] i f ￿ ￿ 0.
5
Th e uni fo rm di stribution
obta i ns if ￿ = 1; the e xp o nen tial ob tai ns i f ￿ = 0; the P a ret o o btains if ￿ = ￿
￿
￿ =
￿1= ( 1+ ￿ ) and ￿ = 0 . The reduce df o rm pri cing equation if F (x )=F
￿






















C l e a r l y , t h e p r ic eo f p r o duct i do e s n ot de pe nd o n the q ua l it y of pro duct i’ s com p etitors
in this ex a m pl e.
An i m p o rtan t question i sw h e ther the re e xist i n tere st ing econom ic m o dels of e quil ib-
riumb e ha vior that yie ld di￿er en t predi ctions tha n the s trong a nd w eak pre dicti on s o f
m o n opo l y po w er deri v e da b o v e . If not, the n not m uc hi n teresti n g can b e l earned from
reje cti o n o f the pre di cti o n so fm o nop oly p o w er.
Co nsider ￿rst the sim pl em o del of p erfe ct c om pe titi on . In this m o del pric e equals






). As i nP anzar and Ros se (19 87), the m o del of
p erfec t com p etiti o n the n yie lds the sa m e predi ction as the m o del with m onop oly p o w er:
the quali tie s of ￿rm i ’s com p eti to rs do not in￿uenc e the pri ce of ￿rm i .H o w ev er, the
eq ui li brium notion of p e rfect c om pe titi on i s not a v ery plaus i ble o ne when the re are
only a￿ n i te , and t y picall ys m al l, n um b er of ￿rm s in the industry . Am ore sensibl e
eq u i li brium notion that cap ture sc om p eti tiv e conduct a m o ng a ￿n i te n um be r of ￿rm s
is the B ertrand- N as h e q uili brium . This equi li brium i sd e ￿n e db y the c o ndi tions that
eac h ￿rm u ni laterall ym ax im i zes its o wn pro￿t with resp e ct to i ts o wn pric e, giv en the
pric es set b yi ts co m pe titors. Only if th e n um be ro f￿ r m sg o e st oi n￿ ni t y the pri cing
eq u ati o ns reduce to t he m a rgi na l c o st equations of p e rfect com p eti tion. In th e m ore
5
Noti c e a sli gh tly di￿er en tn o tation for the up p erb o un d. It do es not nec ess ari ly c oi nc i de with
￿
￿ ,a s
it w as de noted b e f ore .8
plausible ca se wi th a ￿ ni te n um be r of ￿rm s the reduce d form pric ing e quations do not
ha v e a sim ple solution. The sim pl es p e c ial cases o f t w o , three or four ￿rm s wit ha
uniform or an e xp onen tial distri bution of the taste para m eter ￿ nev erthe less a l ly iel d the
foll o w i ng pre dicti o n of B ertrand- N as h e quil ibrium ,i n s trong con tras t w i th the predi cti on s
of m o nop ol yp o w e r.
6
Predi ction of Ber trand - Nash eq uili brium : T he price o f pro duc t i m a yd e pe nd o n
a l l q u ali tie s v
1
￿ ￿ ￿ v
n
, ev eni fg
0 0
( x ) = 0. F urtherm or e , the qua l iti es v
i+ 1
￿ ￿ ￿ v
n
ha v e a
p o siti v ei m pa c to np
i




m a yh a v e a nega ti v e or p o siti v e
im pa c to n p
i
.
I n tuiti v el y ,a n i nc rease in the quali t y of a higher quali t yc om p eti tor j , j> i , b oth
inc reas e s j ’s m arginal c o st and decre a ses j ’ s s ubstitutabil it y for i, so tha t th e pric eo f
p r o d u c t i , p
i
, i n c r e a s e s under Be rtra nd com p etiti on . In con tras t, an i ncrease in the
quali t yo fal ow er quali t y com pe titor j , j< i ,i ncreases j ’s m a rginal co st but also
inc reas e s j ’ s substitutabili t y for i, so that the pric e o f pro duct i , p
i
, m a y e ither dec rease
or i ncrease under Bert ra nd com p etiti on .
N o t e tha t the Be rtra nd-Nash e quil ibrium i sc e rta i nly not the only plausibl ea l terna ti v e
to the e quil ibri um wi th m o nop oly p o w er. I n particul a r, there m a y b e equi li bria that li e
so m ewhere i nb e t w ee n these t w oe xtrem es.
7
These \i n -be t w een" equi li bria a re li k el yt o
y i eld sim ilar qua l itativ e to the predi ctions of the Bertrand-Nas h equi li brium ,a l tho ugh
the p re dicti on s m a y not b e as cl ear- c ut. Ho w e v e r, to sim plif y the discuss i on b e lo w I will
fo c us atten ti o n to the t w oe xtrem es.
5 Em pi rical t e sts for m onop oly p o w e r
The a b o v e ￿ndings sugg est to esti m ate a g e nera l reg r ess i on m ode li nw h i c h the pric e p
i
is allo w ed to dep end o n a l l quali tie s v
k

























The calculati ons of the gi v en ex a m ples are straigh tf orw ard, a nd a v ail able on reque st.
7
F orm al ly ,s u c h equili bria m a yb em o deled in a rep eated gam ei nw hi c h t he discoun t factor is not
su￿cien tl yl arge for t he m onop ol y soluti on to b e sus tai nable, but su￿cien tly large f or an equil ibri um
in b et w ee n the m ono po ly a nd th e Be rtrand-Nash s o lutio n to b e s ustainabl e.9
where h(p
i
) i sa ni ncreasing transfo rm at i on of p
i
, a nd w he re ￿
i
is a \ pre dicti o n error" ,
p o ssibly inc luding an error i nm easuring pric e( e .g. due to uno bser v ed d i scoun ts, as in
Bre sn ahan, 198 7). Measure the quali ties v
i









where ￿ is a v ector o f para m eters to b e esti m ated.
The h yp otheses to b e te st e d are the pre dicti o n so fm ono p oly p o w er. If the stro ng
predi ction of m o n opol yp o w er ho l ds, then a l l ￿
i;j
=0 . I fi n add i tion the w e a k predi ction















whic h is just the p op ul ar he donic sp eci ￿cation.
8
If the h yp o the se so fm o nop oly p o w er
are reje cted, the n t he al ternativ eh yp othesis of Be rtra nd-Nash equi li br i um holds. I n this
case th e pre di cti on of B e rtran d-Nash e quil ibri um , based on th e e xam ple s a nd in t ui tion
discussed i n the previ o us secti o n, sug gests tha t ￿
i;j
> 0 , whereas the sign o f ￿
i;j
is
am bi g uous.
U n f o r tuna te ly ,t oe st i m ate (7 ) a tre m endous am oun t o fd a t ai s r e quire d. Ev e ni f
q u ali t y is dire ctl y obs e rv e d( o r ￿ is k no wn), there rem ain n ￿ 1 ￿ n para m eters to




). A pa rti cul ar m ark e t at a pa rti cular p e rio d in tim e
consists of just n obs e rv at i o ns, i m ply ing the ne ed fo r data on a v e ry large n um be r o f
m ark ets a nd/o r ti m e p eri od s . F urtherm ore, the para m eters m a y n ot ev en b e sta bl e
o v er the m ark e ts or tim ep e r i ods . Cle ar l y , som e structure should b e i m pos e d on the




to m ak e esti m ation p oss i ble . In princ iple ,t hi s structure m a y
b e deri v ed ex plic itl y from the m o del o f v e rtic a l pro duct di￿eren tiation, a fte ri m p o sing
sp e ci￿c func tiona l form as sum pti o ns, and after de￿ni n g a n equi li brium notion, co v ering
the m o n opol y equi li br i um a nd s om e other p oss i ble eq uili bria, suc h as the Bert ra nd-Nash ,
ass p e c ial cases. H o w ev er, suc h a n ap proac hw ould s hare m an y of the problem s of the
structural form ap proac h: i tw ou l dq uic kly b ec om e com putationa l ly i n tractable, and the
im p osed structure w ould rem ai n pa rtl y arb i trary a n yw a y , as it dep ends o n the sp eci ￿c
8
The hed o nic re g re ss i on m o del m a y the refore not onl y b e founded in a p e rfec tl y com p etitiv ef ra m e-
w ork, as in R ose n (1 973), but also i nap e r f ec t m o nop oly fram ew ork. F o r e xam ple, the freque n tl yu s e d






is t he m onop ol ys o l ution if the di s tributi on f unc ti on F
￿
(x )g i v en b y (5)
hol ds , and the m a rg i nal c ost function i s giv en b y c ( v
i











m a y b e eas i ly v e ri￿ed from (6). This m argi nal cost func ti on is incre asing f or v
i
> l n(￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿￿ )=(1 + ￿),
and con v ex, as r equi r ed.10
functi o nal fo rm as sum pt i on s. It a re prec isel y these pro bl em s tha t I am trying to a v oid
here !
I therefore follo wa na l ternativ e, m ore ￿exi ble a pproac h a nd direc tly im p ose v ari ou s




i n (7 ). More sp e ci￿c al ly ,I p r o-
p o se to estim a te the follo wi ng a l ternativ er e gr e ss i on m od e ls to te s t for the presence of
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). The re gr e ss i on s













, b ut this did no t a￿ect the
em piri ca l results.




is based on the in tuiti o n that




a re di￿ere n t fro m ze ro ,
then e sp ec iall y the qualit ies of pro d uc t i’ s\ c lose" com p etit o rs are l ik el yt oi n￿u e nce the
pric e o f pro duc t i .I t can b e v e ri￿e d that t hi si si ndeed the case un de rt he a l terna ti v e
h y p othesis o f Be rtra nd com p eti tion, usi ng t h e abo v em en ti on e de xa m ples o f t w o , thre e
or fo ur ￿ rm s with a uniform or ex p onen ti a l distri b uti o n o f the ta ste pa ram et er ￿ . The
￿rst regression m ode li m pos e st he m ost restri ctiv e s truc tu r e: it all o ws pro du c t i’ s pric e
t ob eaf un c tion only o f it s closest l o w er a nd higher q ua l it yv arian t. Regression 2 also
all ows pro duct i ’s pric e to b e a func tion o f i ts s e cond closest lo w e r a nd hi g her qua l it y11
v arian t. Re gr e ss i o n 3i sas p e c i al c a se o f regression 2, re st r icti ng the i n￿uence o f the t w o
lo w er and higher q ua l it yv arian ts to b e geom etri call y dec li ni ng . Regression 4 app l ie s this
geom etri call yd e cl ining s e quence t oa l ll o w er a nd higher quali t yv arian ts of pro duct i.
Using (8 ) , regressions 1, 2, a nd 3 can b e e as i ly e st i m ated using s om e n onli near least
squares estim a tor. T of a c ili tate esti m ation o f regress i on 4 I ap p l y a tra nsform ation
sim ilar to the Ko y c k transfo rm at i o n. Note ￿rst tha t for i =1 ￿￿ ￿ n ￿ 1
ln(p
i
) ￿ ￿ l n( p
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T h i s yie lds fo r obs e rv at i on s i =2 ￿￿ ￿n ￿ 1
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Sim il a rl y , for the ￿rs t and the n-th o bserv ation:
ln(p
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)=( 1 ￿ ￿￿ )v
n







De￿ne a du m m yv ar i ab l e l
i
= 1 if the pro du c ti so ft h e l o w est quali t y( i .e . the ￿rst
obs e rv at i o n), a nd l
i
= 0 otherwise. Sim il ar l yd e ￿ne h
i
=1 i f the pro d uc ti s of the
highest q u ali t y (i. e. t he n -th o bserv ati o n) and h
i
= 0 otherwise. T he n it is p o ssibl et o
write re gr e ss i o n 4 as:
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for i =1 ￿￿ ￿ n . Note that thi s regression is a utoregressiv e: it con tains b o th a l a g and
al e a d of the e ndo genous v ariable p
i
.F u rthe rm ore, th e error term is seri al ly correl at e d.
Co nseq uen tl y ,al eas t s q ua re se stim ator is i nc o nsi st e n t and a n i ns trum en tal v ari ab l e
esti m ato r is nece s sary to esti m ate regress i o n 4. I ha v eu s e d the el em en ts o f the v ector
of ph ysical c ha racte ristic s, x
i
,a s w el l a s the lag s an d the le a ds o f these el em e n ts as
instrum e n ts.12
Regressions 1, 2, 3 and 4 re quire a \correc t" ranki n g of the q u ali tie s v
i
.I f q u ali t yi s
d i r e c t l y obs e rv e d this can b e e a sil y done. More g e nera l ly ,h o w ev er, the qualiti es ne ed
to b e e stim ated b y x
i
￿ . I nt h i s cas e I wil l req uire the ra nki ng of the quali tie st o b e
c o n s i s t en t with the estim at e s in the fo l lo wi ng se ns e : the ranking of the qua l iti es as
im pli ed b y the e stim ates s hould no t con tradic t the ranking th at w a s a ssum e d to obtain
the estim at e s. T o obta i nac o nsisten t ranking I use the fo l lo wing pro cedure. I n a ￿rst




= 0 in (7) and estim a te the m o del . An i nitial estim a t eo ft h e




￿ is then o btained, a l lo wing to order the qualit ies. Then a second s tage





new e stim ates ca n then b e us e dt or e - order the q ua l iti es once a gain. This pro c edure is
rep eated un ti lc on v ergenc ei sr e ac hed, i. e. un til the quali tie s d o no long e r need to b e
reordere d.
6 T w o a p p l i c a ti ons
I ha v e used t w od i ￿e ren t sam ple s to a ppl y the pro p o sed te s ts for m on o pol yp o w e r: the
m ark et for sprea dshee ts in the U S (1 986 -19 91 ) a nd the m ar k et for ‘ eng i ne v arian ts’ in
the 199 0 F renc hc ar m ar k et.
9
The ￿rs t sam ple a l lo ws to test the h y p othesis of m on o pol y
po w er acros s spreadsh e et prog ram sa tag i v e n tim ep e r i od. Th e se cond s am pl e all o ws t o
t e s t t he h y p othesis of m o nop ol yp o w er a cross the eng i ne v ari an ts o f the sam eg i v e n car
m o del.
Th e ￿rs t sam ple co v ers 6 y ears of the U S s pre a dsheet m ar k et, w i th a b ou t 15 s pre ad -
sheet pro gram s p er y e ar . Thi sy i elds a pa nel of 9 1 spreadsheet o bserv ati o ns for the
p erio d 1 986 -19 91 . Th e f ol lo wi ng v ariable s a re us e d here.
10
The e ndo genous v ari ab l e
i sL P R I CE , the log of the l ist price o f a s i ng l e cop y of the spread shee t pro gra m . The
ex o genous v ari ab l es a re sev eral ph ysical c hara c teri st i cs of the spre a dsheet. The v ari ab l e
LMIN R C is the log o f the m i ni m um of the m ax i m um n um be ro f r o w s and colum ns that
the spread shee tc a n ha ndl e. T he dum m yv ariable L O TU Se qua l s one if the pro gram is
pro duce db y Lotu s Dev elopm e n t Corp oration, and e qua l sz ero otherwise . The dum m y
9
The data on spr eadshe ets w ere pro vi de d b y Neil Ganda l. The data on the F re nc hc a rm ark et ,
includi ng the data o n t he e xtra o pt i on e q ui pm en t, w er e c o ll e cte d from t w o sourc es : Autom obi lR e vue
and l ’ Argus de l’ Aut o m obi le e t des Lo c o m oti ons .
1 0
See G andal (1994 ) for a m ore de tai led discu ssion of thes e data.13
v ariable G RA PHS e qua l so n e i f the progra m can p erform all bas i c graphs . W I NDO Wi s
a v a r i a ble equal to t w oi f the m axi m um n um b e ro fw i nd o ws on the scree ni s sixte en or
m ore; equal to o ne if th i sm axi m um is fr om t w o to ￿ftee n; and equal to zero otherwise.
LOC OM P i s a dum m yv ariable e qua l to on e if the pro gram is c om pa ti ble with the Lo -
tus (WKS, WK1) form at. E X TD A T is a dum m yv ar i ab l e equal to o ne if the pro gram
pro vi des li nks to e xternal da ta bases. LAN CO M i s a dum m yv ariable e qua l to one if the
prog ram ca n li nk i nd e pe nd e n t users t h rough a lo ca l area net w ork. L I NKI NG i s a dum m y
v ariable e qual to o ne if the v al ues in sev eral w or k sh e ets can b e up dated at the sa m et i m e.
In a ddit ion to these ph ysical c haracteri stics the re are 5 tim e dum m yv ari a ble s TIME87 ,
TIME88, T I ME89 , TI ME9 0, TIM E 91.
Using the a b o v ev ariables, T ab l e 1 pre se n ts esti m at es o f the v ec to r ￿ in ( 7 ) and








=0 . R e call tha t t hi s is just a
sim p l e h e do ni c re gr e s sion, w hi c hh o l d s under the n ul lh yp o the si so f m o n opol yp o w er.
The incl uded v ar i ab l es in this regression a re sel ect ed fro m a larger set o f v ariable s,
b a se d on t h e i r s i gni￿c an t con tributi o n to the re gr e ss i on .
11
Th e pa ram e ter e s ti m ates
of the ph ysic al c haracteri st i cs all ha v e the e xp e cted p o sit iv e sign. Th e tim e dum m y
v ariables ha v e nega ti v e pa ram e ter estim at e s, i ndicating that th e \ q ua l it y a djusted" pric e
of spreadsheets is decre as i ng o v e rt i m e .
T h es e c o n d sa m ple cons i s t s of 38 pop u l a r E urop e an m o del ss o l d in th e 19 90 F renc h
car m ark e t. T he Re na ul tC l io and the V olk sw agen G olf are ex am pl es o f the se m o del s.
E ac hm od e li ss o l d i n abou t 5 di￿eren te ng i ne v ar i an ts . Thi sy i el d s a panel of 19 6
obs e rv at i o ns on engine v ari an ts. The f ol lo wing da ta are used. The e ndo genous v ari ab l e
i s L PR ICE, whic h is the log o f the l ist pric eo fa v arian t. The v ariable WE I GH Ti s
the to tal w ei gh t of the car, i ncl ud i ng a l l equi pm en t (in to n). WIDTH is th e m ax i m um
width (in m ). H ORSEP O WER i st h e v ar i an t’s m axim um hors e po w e r (in 1 00 k il o w a tt).
DIESEL is a dum m yv ariable e qual to one if the v arian th a sa d i esel e ng i ne. C Y LI NDER
is the c yli nder v olum e( i ndm
3
).D i ￿e ren t engine v ar i an ts of the sa m em o del ha v e the
sam e width and app ro x im a tel y the sa m ew ei gh t. They di ￿ er in horsep o w e r, die se l and
1 1
The la rg er s et o f v a ri ables is discus se d i nG a ndal (19 94). It is w orth m en tio ning that i tw as p oss i ble
to re pl icate h i s r es ul ts . As sho wn b y Gandal (1994 ) , th e u se d s p e ci ￿c a tion i sn o te n tirely stable o v er
tim e . The param e ter s o f the v a ri abl e s LMINR C, LANCOM and LINK ING di￿er s i gni ￿c an tl yo v er t w o
se parate sam pl e p er i od s (1 986- 1988 v er sus 1989 -199 1). I the re f ore a lso appl ied the tes ts fo rm onop ol y
po w er to the ‘unst a ble’ sp e ci￿catio n , and o bt a ined s i m i lar res ul ts .14
cy linde rv olum e. A b ase mo del is de￿ned a s the v ari an t o f a partic ular m od e lw i th the
lo w est spe c i￿cation o f h orsep o w er and cyl inder v ol um e, an d wi th out die se l. I did not
inc lude dum m yv ariable s to estim at e t h e "m o del -s pe c i ￿c e￿ec ts " (an al og ou s t o t he t i m e
d u m m i e s i n the sa m ple o f spread shee ts). Thi su s e su pm an y degree s of free do m (38 ),
and the m o del - spe c i￿c e￿ects a re captured fa i rly w el lb y the incl ud e dm o del-sp eci ￿c
c ha racte ristic s WEIGHT a nd WIDTH an yw a y .









= 0 . T he se v ar i ab l es are sel ect ed from a regression
with a larger s e to f v ar i ab l es, ba se d on thei rs i gn i ￿ca nc e. This larg e r set a l so inc luded the
c ha racte ristic s LENGTH, HEIGH T, N U MCYL (n um be ro fc y l inders), a nd ￿rm dum m y
v ariables (f or F iat, F o rd, GM, PSA, Renault and V ol ksw a gen).
12
A ll pa ram e ter e st i m ates
ha v e th e exp ecte d pos i tiv e sign.
Th e hedo ni c param eter e st im ates in T able s 1 an d 2 are used to obtain an initi al
ranking o f the q ua l iti es. In the ￿rst sa m ple the q ua l iti es o f all s pre a dsheets i ne ac h
g i v e n y e a r a r e r a nk ed. I n the second sam ple the quali ties o f a l l engine v ar ian ts of e ac h
g i v e n c ar m o d el are ra nk ed. Th e n a n initi al e st i m ate is obta i ned of the pa ram e ters
in Regressions 1, 2 , 3 , and 4. Based on t he se e st i m ates a new ranking of qua l iti es
is o btaine d . Regress i o n s 1 ,2 ,3a n d 4a r e the n re-esti m ated un til a re - orderi ng is no
longer requir ed.
1 3




i n the case
of regression 2 ) are pre se n ted on T ab l es 3 and 4 . T os a v e space, the esti m ates o f the
other p aram ete rs are no t presen ted. They gene ra l ly did no t di ￿e r v ery m uc h from the
esti m ates i nT able s 1 and 2 .
Th e results in T able 3 are i n s tark c on trast with the re su l ts in T ab l e4 . I nT able 3 ,
the m ar k et fo r s pre a dshee ts , alm os t a l le st i m ates of ￿ an d ￿ ar e si gn i ￿can tly di￿ere n t
from zero, w i th the e xce pt i on of som e of the e st i m ates fo r regression 2. All s i gn i ￿can t
esti m ates of ￿ a re p o siti v e; all signi￿can t estim at e so f ￿ a re nega ti v e . The i ns i gn i ￿can t
esti m ates i nr e gr e ss i on 2 m a y b e due to the li ttle structure i m p o sed in this regress i on .
1 2
The stabil it y of the param ete rs of the i n cluded v ariabl es w as te ste d b y r unni ng t w o se parate (he-
doni c ) r egres sio n s, one for a s a m ple of onl yF re nc h cars, one fo r a sam pl eo f o nly foreign cars . All
param e ter s turne d out to b e stable.
1 3
In the c a se o f e ngi ne v ari an ts t w oi t eratio ns w e re require d. In the cas e of s preads heet s c on v e rgenc e
w as not al w a ys obtai ne d. Ho w ev er , t h e pa ra m ete r e stim ate s did not al te r v ery m uc ho v er iter ati ons. In
cas e of no con v erge nce t he es ti m ates a fte r t w o iterations are pr ese n ted.15
This is s uggested b y the signi￿c an te st i m ate of ￿ and ￿ in regression 3 , w hi c hi sa
r e s t r i cted v e rsion of re gr e ss i on 2. I nc on tra st, i nT able 4, the m ark e t for ‘engine v arian ts’,
the estim ates o f th e para m eters ￿ and ￿ are usually not signi￿can t. F urtherm ore, the
m agn i tude of the e st i m ates of ￿ an d ￿ i sm uc hs m al le r in the m ark e t fo r eng i ne v arian ts
(T ab l e 4) than i n the m ark e t for sp re a dshee ts (T able 3).
14
Th e s e con trasting results m a yb ei n terpre ted as follo ws. The pre se nce o f m on o pol y
po w er is s i gn i ￿can tly re jec ted in the m ark e t for sprea dshee ts . This foll ows from the
fact that the c h aracteri stics of pro duct i ’s com p etitors signi￿can tl y in￿uenc e the pri ce of
pro duct i. Note that the signs o f ￿ (p ositi v e )a n d ￿ (nega ti v e ) are c o nsisten t with the
alternativ eh y p othesis o f B ertrand c om pe titi o n. The presence of m ono p oly p o w er o v er
pric e o n di￿ere n t eng i ne v ar ian ts of a giv en car m o del ca nnot b e re jecte db y the da ta.
Th e em piri ca l re su l ts a re consisten t with sev eral fa c ts. First, the results are c o nsiste n t
with the o wnershi p struc tu re in b o th m ar k ets. Di ￿e ren t spreadsheets prog ram s are
usua l ly o wned b yd i ￿e ren t ￿rm s, where a s di￿eren t engine v arian ts of a sp ec i￿c car m o del
are of course o wned b y the sam e ￿rm . The rej ecti o n of m o nop oly p o w e ri n t h e m ark et for
spreads he etsi sa l s o consisten tw i th the relati v el yl a rge n um be r o f acti v e￿ r m s, u suall y
b et w e en ten or ￿ f teen during eac hy ear. This larg e n um b er proba bl ym ak e sc ol lusion
di￿ cult. Finall y , th e presenc eo fm o nop oly p o w er i n the m ar k et fo r eng i ne p o w er is
consisten tw i th Sc here r’s (19 80, p . 39 4) o bserv ati o n (for the A m eri can m ark et ). H e
quotesa m e m or a ndum o n the 19 66 Am eri can F ord G alaxi es e da n, stating that the
whol esa l e pri ce m in u s acc ou n ti ng c os t i sm uc h higher on the high quali t y eng i ne v arian ts
than o n the l o w quali t yv ar i an ts, a price di sc rim i na ti o n pra c tice whic hi s easier to ex pl ain
in the presenc eo fm o nop oly p o w er than i n the absence of it.
Th e consistency of the e m pir ical results with the ap rior i evi dence on b oth m ark ets
is e ncou raging. It sugg e s ts that the de v e lop e de m pi rical tests can a l so b e used i n other
app l ic at i o ns, in whic hi t i sl e ss o b vi ou s a pri ori whether o r not m onop oly p o w er is
1 4
Som e care had to b e tak en to al lo wf o r a re asonabl ec o m parison of the m a gnitude s of ￿ and ￿ .I
m ul tipl ied the prices o f spr eadshe ets b y a const a n t factor, de ter m ined s uc h that the a v erage price o f
spr eadshe ets equal s the a v er a ge pr i c e of engine v a ri an ts. In a hedonic regre ss i on, wi th the ln(PRICE) as
the dep e nden tv ari able, this m ultipl icatio n of course o nl y a￿ec ts the constan t in t he v ec tor ￿ . Thi si sn o
lo nge r the c ase i n regre ss i ons 1, 2, 3 and 4, b e caus e t here is no ‘ tr ue’ c o ns tan t te rm in the se re g re ss i ons .
It w as a c tual ly not p o s sibl e to e stim ate suc ha‘ tr ue’ constan tt e r m ,g i v en the i nc l ude d constan ti n t h e
v ec tor ￿ .16
presen t. F or p olic y purp o ses one m a y vie w then the tests as o ne extra pi ece of p o ssibl e
ev idence fo r the presenc eo fm onop oly p o w er.
7 Su g ges ted exten sions
The tests for m onop oly p o w e r p r opos e d in this pap e r are bas e d o n a fairl y general m o del
of v e rtic a l pro duct di ￿ ere n tiati on , c o v eri ng past theoretic al an d e m piri cal appli cations as
sp e cial cas e s, f or e xam ple Bresnaha n’ s ( 19 87 ) a n al ysis of coll us i v eb e ha vior i n the Am er-
ic an c ar m ark et b e t w e en 1 954 -19 56 . Nev erthe less, the re su l ts o ugh tt o b ei n terpre ted
with care. So m ei m p orta n t ass um pt ion s ha v e sti ll b een m ade. Th e se co ul d b e rel ax ed
in further w ork.
Th e ￿rst a ssum pti on i s tha t pro d uc t di￿eren tiation o c curs in just one q u ali t y di-
m e ns i o n. T hi s i s in fact equi v al en t to a ssum i ng sev eral quali t yd i m ensi o ns a s long as
consum er pref erence sf o rq ua l it ya r ep erfe ctl y c orr elat e d o v e r these dim ensions . Ho w-
ev er, it is p ossible th at suc h a p erfe ct correl at i o n do e s not h old i n the ab o v ec o nside red
sa m ples. In b oth the m ark et fo r sp re a dshee ts a nd the m ar k et for engine v arian ts the re
m a y b e t w oq ua l it y dim ensions . In the m ark e t for spread shee ts, a ￿rs t dim e ns i on i s
‘ po w er’ , as captured b y the v ar i ab l es L MI NR C , GRA PHS, WIN DO W and LIN KIN G.
A second di m ensi o n is ‘ net w o rk acce s sabil it y ’, a s cap ture db y the v ariables L OCOM P ,
EXTD A T and L A NCOM. Co nsum er p re fere nc es m a y not b e p e rfec tly c o rre lated o v er
these t w oq ua l it yd i m ensions. Si m i larly , in the m ar k et for ‘ eng i ne v ar i an t s ’ a ￿rst qua l it y
dim ension i s eng i ne p o w e r, as captured b yH ORSEP O WER and C Y LI NDER. The v ari-
able D I ESE L c a ptures a sec o nd qua l it yd i m ension of an e n gine v arian t, and i ti s a gain
not cle a r whethe r cons um er prefe rence s are p erfe ctl y correl at e do v e r these t w od i m en-
sions . The ass um ption tha t pro duc ts are di ￿e ren ti at e d in just on e qualit yd i m ension
is em piri cally tra nslated i nt h e a ssum ption tha t i t is p ossible to unam bi g uous l y rank
all pro duc ts according to thei r‘ quali t y’ .I tw ou l db e av ery i n tere st i ng topic for future
researc h to ana l yze ho we m piri cal te st sw ou l d generali ze if su c h an unam bi g uous ranking
is no t p o ssibl eb e caus e of the presence of m ore tha n one (s a yt w o) q ua l it yd i m ensi o ns.
Th e s e cond assu m ption m ade in the ana l ysis i s that eac hv erti cally di￿eren tiated
m ark et c a n b e treated a s an i nd e pe nd e n tm ar k et, without subs ti tution across m ark e ts .
In the c a s eo fs p r e a dshee ts s old in a giv en tim e p erio d, this assu m ption m e a ns that the re17
is no in tertem p oral s ubsti tu ti on . In the cas e of engine v arian ts of a giv en ca r m o del,
the ass um ption m eans tha t the re i s no subs ti tution b e t w e en di￿eren t car m od e ls. I f this
as sum pti o n is not e a sy to justi fy , the prop osed tests m a y a ga i nn e ed m od i ￿cation.
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